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While congressional committee members sometimes hold hearings to collect and transmit 
specialized information to the floor, they also use hearings as venues to send political messages 
by framing an issue or a party to the public which I refer to as “grandstanding.” However, we 
lack clear understanding of when they strategically engage in grandstanding. I argue that when 
committee members have limited legislative power they resort to making grandstanding speeches 
in hearings to please their target audience. Using 12,820 House committee hearing transcripts 
from the 105th to 114th Congresses and employing a crowd-sourced supervised learning method, 
I measure a “grandstanding score” for each statement that committee members make. Findings 
suggest that grandstanding efforts are made more commonly among minority members under a 
unified government, and non-chair members of powerful committees, and in committees with 
jurisdiction over policies that the president wields primary power, such as foreign affairs and 
national security. 
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While congressional committee hearings are designed to collect and transmit policy relevant 
information to the floor (Krehbiel 1992), committee members sometimes use hearings as 
opportunities to send political messages by taking positions on policy issues or framing the 
image of a party or the administration (DeGregorio 1992; Del Sesto 1980; Esterling 2004; 
Farnsworth 1961; Huitt 1954; Park 2017), a set of behaviors I refer to collectively as 
“grandstanding.” When members grandstand in hearings, would the statements they make 
merely be spontaneous reactions to witnesses’ testimonies, or would there be any systematic 
reason for them to do so? Previous studies find that what members say in hearings influences 
public opinion (DeGregorio 1992; Kriner and Schikler 2014) and is rewarded by special interests 
(Esterling 2007; Ray 2018). Yet, despite the increased political salience of congressional 
hearings in recent years, we do not have clear understanding of when and why committee 
members use hearings to send political messages or grandstand.  
 There are a handful of previous works that directly or indirectly address this question. 
Extant literature finds that members tend to grandstand and promote their predetermined views 
in hearings when committee members’ policy preferences are polarized (Huitt 1954; Park 2017) 
or when political benefits of grandstanding is likely to be large – e.g. when the issue is salient 
(DeGregorio 1992; Park 2017). Although not directly referring to committee hearings, Fenno 
(1973) argues that while conducting committee activities members can achieve their reelection 
goals by taking positions in a way to represent and protect their constituents’ interests. Further, 
the literature on message politics hints a similar story but emphasizes partisan competition for 
winning the majority control in a chamber as a major reason for position-taking (Evans and 
Oleszek 2001; Lee 2011, 2016). However, these electoral accounts have been neither explicitly 
argued nor tested in a committee hearing setting. 
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In this study, I propose a new theoretical explanation and argue that committee members 
tend to grandstand as an electoral campaign strategy especially when they lack institutional 
power to pursue their policy agenda. That is because when they have limited opportunities to 
please voters by making policies representing their interests, members will resort to making 
speeches to please them. Specifically, I identify three such conditions in which members have 
limited legislative power within a committee: being a member of a minority and opposition 
party, a non-chair member of a prestige committee, or a member of a committee with jurisdiction 
over issue areas that the president dominates such as foreign and national security policies. 
To test this theoretical claim, I construct an original dataset of committee hearing 
transcripts on 12,820 House hearings from the 105th to 114th Congresses and measure a 
“grandstanding score” for each individual statement made by committee members utilizing a 
crowd-sourced supervised learning method. Then, I aggregate the score by individual member in 
each Congress to conduct a member-level analysis. Taking advantage of the panel structure of 
the member-level data, I estimate within-individual effects of members’ minority and opposition 
party status. By additionally conducting a statement-level analysis and exact matching, I test 
whether the same member tends to grandstand more in prestige committees or in committees 
dealing with foreign or national security policy issues than in other committees.     
The key findings are as follows. First, minority members are more likely to grandstand 
than majority members in order to offset their lack of institutional power to advance legislation, 
particularly under a unified government. Second, grandstanding statements are more frequently 
made by non-chair members of prestige committees (Appropriations, Budget, Rules, Ways and 
Means) in which committee leaders propose most of the bills. Third, members of Congress are 
more likely to grandstand in hearings before the committees dealing with policies where the 
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president plays a primary role, such as foreign affairs and national security. These findings 
suggest that committee members grandstand in hearings not just spontaneously but rather for a 
more systematic reason: to compensate their lack of ability to affect policy and to verbally appeal 
to their target audience. In addition, it further implies that grandstanding, which is often 
considered wasteful, can be a useful political tool for politicians to communicate issue frames to 
voters or any other external audience and thus can change the electoral climate in favor of 
themselves and their party.  
More broadly, it also contributes to the literature on message politics. Message politics 
refers to the practice by party leadership encouraging its members to repeatedly advertise the 
party’s themes and policy stances to the public to enhance party image while tainting the public 
standing of the other party or the president (Evans and Oleszek 2001), and it is increasingly 
employed as a party-level campaign strategy as a result of intensified partisan competition (Lee 
2011, 2016). In light of this literature, findings of this study suggest that messaging activities are 
exerted even in committee hearings, which is a novel addition to the existent literature. 
Furthermore, this article provides a new insight to the classic discussion on show-horses 
versus work-horses (Matthew 1959; Payne 1980). Previous studies demonstrate that show horses 
focus on fostering their public recognition and are relatively less ambitious about policy-making 
whereas work horses emphasize their legislative activity more than public perception and that 
individual members tend to be classified as either type. However, the finding that the same 
member grandstands if situated in a committee environment with less legislative opportunities 
but does not otherwise implies that members’ role choices may not be a deterministic feature of 
individuals such as personality as commonly believed (Payne 1980) but rather a strategic choice 




Members of Congress are known to be single-minded reelection seekers (Mayhew 1974). In 
order to achieve this goal, they are incentivized to use their limited time and resources in a way 
to maximize their chances of reelection. While in D.C., they spend over 35% of their time on 
legislative and policy work which usually happens in committees,1 and individual committees 
spend significant time on holding public hearings. This suggests that committee activities 
including hearings may reward members electorally (Fenno 1973). This section explains how 
committee members can utilize their participation in public hearings to enhance their reelection 
prospects and which institutional constraints may affect members’ strategic behaviors.  
Once a committee member decides to participate and talk in a hearing, I assume that he 
can utilize his chance to talk in two different ways to maximize the odds of reelection: One is to 
ask witnesses for policy relevant information and have constructive discussion on a policy issue 
with an intention to make a policy benefiting his constituents; the other is to give a political 
statement with an intention to take positions on policies along with his supporters and even give 
them a guidance of how to view -in other words, frame- an issue, a party or the President and his 
administration, which can be further used to formulate campaign messages (Park 2017).2 Note 
 
1 From “Life in Congress: The Member Perspective” which is a report produced by the 
Congressional Management Foundation and the Society for Human Resource Management. 
2 It is possible for a member’s speech to do some of both, but it is also possible to place 
members’ statements on a continuum depending on the intensity of one style over the other. In 
order to simplify the theoretical reasoning, I assume that a statement can be characterized as 
either one of the two participation styles represented by these two extreme poles on a continuum. 
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that in a hearing, each member can request a chair for a chance to give an opening statement and 
ask questions of witnesses in a Q&A session with a time-limit of five minutes, which works as a 
budget constraint so that a member should strategically optimize the allocation of their time on 
either of the participation styles.  
Members’ statements they strategically make in hearings can be rewarded through the 
increase in their reelection prospects, but the reward mechanism may depend on the legislative 
constraints under which individual members are situated.3 For example, those who are 
institutionally endowed with the authority and power to move their bills forward successfully can 
be benefited more by focusing on learning about the policy issue through hearings, and thus, 
their statements are likely characterized as information-seeking. On the other hand, those who 
lack such power can hardly gain electoral rewards by appealing to voters based on their 
legislative achievements, and thus their relative payoffs from grandstanding increases. In the 
following subsections, I identify individual members’ minority and opposition party status and 
committee environments as institutional constraints placed on their legislative potent.  
Minority Status and Divided Government 
In contemporary Congress, the majority party wields disproportionately more control over 
legislative processes and resources than the minority (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005). It is 
easier for the majority to set the agenda and pass preferred legislation so long as it enjoys 
 
3 However, of course, the chances that voters are directly exposed to conversation going on in 
each public hearing are low except the ones on highly salient issues that the media intensely 
report. Rather, members are assumed to communicate what they said in hearings through other 
channels such as newsletters, press releases or social media (Slapin et al. 2018). 
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sufficient internal agreement. Thus, majority members are known to be more effective in 
legislation (Volden and Wiseman 2014). In contrast, minority members possess little power over 
legislative processes, and as a result they focus on achieving their goals by sending political 
messages (Lee 2011). The messages may blame the majority party for bypassing the minority’s 
views or blocking passage of bills that the minority supports and call for a change in party 
control in the next election. Thus, Lee (2011) argues that while majority members use their 
institutional power to make policies, minority members focus on grandstanding and message 
politics. Therefore, I expect minority members to make more grandstanding statements in public 
committee hearings (Hypothesis 1A).  
Additionally, given that most hearings are intended for overseeing the executive branch, 
committee members of the opposite party as the president likely see hearings as opportunities to 
deploy political messages critical of the president. Therefore, under a unified government, 
minority party committee members are doubly incentivized to use committee hearings to 
highlight policy failures of the government in order to degrade public support for their partisan 
opponents in Congress and in the White House. Consequently, I expect that minority party 
committee members are more likely to grandstand under a unified government (Hypothesis 1B). 
Powerful Committees 
Some committees tend to provide their members with relatively little legislative opportunities for 
various reasons that are unique to each individual committee. This study identifies two such 
types of committee environments.4 The first is powerful committees. 
 
4 However, I acknowledge that these are not a complete set of categories of the committee 
environments restricting legislative power of their members. Rather, there can be other types that 
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The House Committees on Appropriations, Budget, Rules, and Ways and Means are 
often referred to as the powerful or prestige committees due to their ability to influence almost 
everyone and every bill in the House (Smith and Deering 1997). The Rules Committee 
determines a special rule under which each bill will reach the floor. Appropriations and Budget 
Committees pass spending bills, and because virtually almost all legislation addresses budgetary 
issue, these committees enjoy jurisdiction over most legislative matters. With authority over all 
tax bills, as well as the most nationally salient issues, the Ways and Means Committee 
commands exceptionally broad jurisdiction.  
 However, while these committees may exercise outsized influence in the chamber, non-
chair members of these committees have few opportunities to initiate legislative action because 
high-priority bills are often introduced by the chair rather than by the members. Indeed, Volden 
and Wiseman (2014) find that non-chair members of powerful committees tend to have lower 
legislative effectiveness scores. 
 In addition, much of their committee work concerns bills that fall under the jurisdiction 
of other committees.5 As a result, powerful committee members have low motivation to seek 
information through public hearings on these bills, and members may focus on using hearings as 
opportunities to conduct message politics. Thus, I expect that non-chair members of powerful 
committees are more likely to grandstand in powerful committee hearings (Hypothesis 2).  
 
are not necessarily mutually exclusive. One alternative category can be select committees for 
their lack of authority to legislate bills, and another can be oversight-oriented committees. 
5 However, note that the Ways and Means Committee has a unique policy-oriented jurisdiction 
(e.g. social welfare programs) just as do other non-prestige committees. 
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Jurisdiction with the President’s Dominance  
Compared with the president and the Senate, the House possesses relatively weak authority over 
foreign and national security policy than on other domestic public policies.6 For example, the 
Constitution gives the president the exclusive power to negotiate treaties, appoint ambassadors, 
and command the nation’s armed forces, and endows the Senate exclusively with the Advice and 
Consent Power. Though war declarations require approval in both houses of Congress, the 
president dominates war decisions in practice (Johnson 2013).  
This presidential dominance over foreign and national security policy may incentivize 
members of committees with jurisdiction over these policy areas to engage in message politics 
for at least two reasons. First, given their relatively weak legislative powers in these policy areas, 
messaging is a more impactful legislative tool than it is for members of other committees. 
Second, more power means more responsibility. Thus, when performing oversight on these 
policy areas, committee members can find more opportunities to speak critical of the president 
who holds primary responsibility on these issues. Thus, I expect committee members to engage 
in grandstanding more often when participating in hearings held by committees with jurisdiction 
over foreign affairs or national security policy (Hypothesis 3). During the period I analyze, I 
identify four such committees: The Committees on Foreign Affairs and Armed Services, the 
Select Committee on Benghazi, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. 
 
6 This is not to say that the House wields no power over foreign and military policy, as its 
budgetary and investigatory powers enable it to influence policy in these areas. However, 
because the House lacks the formal powers over these policy areas that the president and the 
Senate enjoy, they wield relatively less power. 
11 
 
Data and Methods 
To examine committee members’ political messaging behavior, I use 12,820 House committee 
hearing transcripts from the 105th to the 114th Congresses to construct a unique variable which 
measures an individual member’s relative propensity to grandstand in committee hearings.7 
Unlike more commonly used floor speech data, the format of these hearing transcripts varies 
across committees and Congresses with much irregularity in labeling of the chair, adding witness 
information to the transcript, and including documented testimonies in the middle of statements. 
In order to deal with these challenges and to correctly identify committee names, committee 
chairs, committee members, and witnesses and remove texts that are not spoken, I utilized both 
Python to implement an automated scraping and parsing method and performed extensive 
manual clean-up.8  
 
7 The transcripts were downloaded from the Government Publishing Office (GPO). The original 
data I constructed include both the House and Senate hearing transcripts, but this study focuses 
only on the House since committee activities are emphasized more in the House than in the 
Senate (Aldrich and Rohde 2009), and the House has larger membership with more variations to 
explore. Before the 105th Congress, each Congress includes only a handful number of hearing 
files that are not representative of the hearings held in the Congress. Also, hearing files of less 
than 20KB do not contain any statements. Thus, I exclude these hearings from the analysis. The 
number of representatives and statements in each Congress is in Table A1 in the online appendix. 
8 In order to identify the names, members, chairs and ranking members of committee, I referred 
to and cross-checked with the committee membership data provided by Govtrack.com 
(https://github.com/unitedstates/congress-legislators) and by Stewart III and Woon.  
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This study utilizes 1,026,677 statements made by committee members during public 
hearings which account for slightly less than a half of all committee hearing statements. Each 
statement is labeled with speaker-level information such as the speaker’s first and last names and 
a unique member identification code, a “Govtrack” number, as well as hearing-level information 
such as a committee code, date and hearing title.9  
 To measure the intensity of grandstanding of each statement, I use a supervised learning 
method, which is preferred to an unsupervised learning method when there is a preset 
categorization to be applied. Supervised learning methods require a subset of data to be manually 
classified by human coders. Following recent studies which demonstrate that crowd-sourced 
human-coders perform better as a group than several trained coders in terms of consistency and 
reproducibility of the codes (Benoit et al. 2016, Montgomery and Carlson 2017), I employed 
online workers at Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurkers, in short) using SentimentIt.  
 
9 The remainder of the committee hearing statements consist of witness testimony and procedural 
statements. Witness testimony is excluded based on the identifying speaker-level information 
that does not correspond to a member of Congress. Procedural statements are excluded by 
removing the first and last statements of a hearing if they contain 80 words or less, statements 
coming right before the first witness’ opening statement since they tend to introduce the profiles 
of witnesses, statements that include “come to order”, “recognize”, “expired”, “yield”, “adjourn” 
or “recess” and contain 80 words or less, and those including both “thank you” and “yield” and 
containing 50 words or less, etc. However, I keep statements containing procedural remarks that 
are longer than 80 words because such a long statement may contain non-procedural contents 
which should be included in the analysis.  
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SentimentIt is a software developed by Montgomery and Carlson (2017) to facilitate 
posting, collecting and analyzing text-coding tasks for MTurkers as well as evaluating the job 
performance of individual workers and screening out those whose choices are deviant relative to 
other workers. Unlike the conventional method of manually classifying each text into one of the 
binary or multiple categories predefined by a researcher, SentimentIt promotes measuring the 
relative intensity of one concept through repeated pair-wise comparisons of randomly paired 
texts in the sample. As a result, SentimentIt yields a continuous measurement of a 
unidimensional concept in each unit of text and places texts on a continuum.10  
The procedure to construct the grandstanding score is as follows. First, in order to select 
training texts, I conducted sampling twice: Once only from the 114th Congress and then from the 
105th through 114th Congresses after the study expanded to cover a broader range of time period. 
In each phase, I randomly chose a subset of hearings, decomposed long statements into 
paragraphs, and merged them back with adjacent short paragraphs if they are too short for 
workers to make decisions on them. Among these preprocessed statements, which I will now 
refer to as paragraphs, I sampled 1000 of them that contain from 50 to 120 words in the first 
sampling phase and 2000 in the second.11  
 
10 Because this method of measurement measures legislators’ relative tendency to grandstand or 
the relative intensity of grandstanding of each statement it does not allow measuring the overall 
prevalence of grandstanding statements in the entire corpus. Their overall prevalence can be 
measured through binary coding of the concept in future research. 
11 Note that the second sampling excluded the hearings that were chosen in the first, and larger 
training set generally helps prediction performance of the learning models. Therefore, I use the 
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Second, in each unique task assigned to a worker, I presented two randomly paired 
statements drawn from the sample and asked workers to indicate which one would be better 
described as opinionized or grandstanding as opposed to fact-based or information-seeking. 
Although I am measuring the relative intensity of grandstanding in each statement, in order to 
give coders a clearer definition of what is not grandstanding I conveniently label the opposite 
end of the spectrum as “factual or information-seeking”. In the instructions, I define a 
grandstanding statement as a statement that does one of the following: 1) denounces or praises a 
person or an institution (e.g. a party, its members, the president, a government agency, a witness 
or others); 2) takes a position on a policy (which includes subjective interpretation of a policy-
relevant situation); 3) asks questions meant to embarrass or attack a witness.12 I also specified 
that a statement is factual or information-seeking if it 1) offers an objective description of a 
policy-relevant situation, or 2) asks a witness a question in purpose of fact-finding or seeking 
expert opinion. Then, I present illustrative examples of statement drawn from the data 
corresponding to each case. The full instructions are in the online appendix.13  
 
samples obtained from both sampling procedures with weights applied to learners. The sampling 
procedure for the training set and calculation of the weights are detailed in the online appendix. 
12 Further justification for this definition is provided in the online appendix. 
13 I acknowledge that a grandstanding statement in a hearing can also be stated as a question as if 
the speaker seeks for information. To give MTurkers a clear guidance about how to deal with 
this type of statements, in the instructions I emphasized that “not all questions are information-
seeking but can be part of grandstanding depending on what is being asked and how.”  
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Third, I set SentimentIt to compare each paragraph to 20 other randomly paired 
paragraphs. This setup generated 30,000 comparison tasks which were divided into multiple 
batches. Workers received $0.08 for completing each task.14    
Fourth, I trained potential workers using a Qualtrics survey in which I provided detailed 
instructions about the task, a coding scheme, and examples of statements which can be clearly 
categorized as grandstanding statements and non-grandstanding statements. The survey consists 
of five unscored practice questions and six scored test questions. Each of the eleven questions is 
followed by the correct answer and justifying explanations. Only workers who submitted correct 
answers to five of the six test questions are granted a qualification to work on this task. Among 
387 volunteers, only 169 workers attained qualification and worked on the task.  
Fifth, after collecting data from each batch, I identified those whose task results are too 
deviant from other workers by fitting a Stan model, a built-in function of the SentimentIt 
package.15 Below presents one of the practice questions used to train workers, and the correct 




14 For the texts that are easier to comprehend, SentimentIt recommends 10 paired comparisons 
and $0.04 per comparison. However, given the high level of complexity of the hearing 
statements, I set the bar higher and paid more as specified above. 
15 See Montgomery and Carlson (2017) for a more detailed explanation of the Stan model that 
estimates the SentimentIt score (or the grandstanding score in this study).  
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Table 1. An Example Practice Question Used to Train Workers via Qualtrics Survey 
Practice Question #1. 
Please read two statements below and click on the button that corresponds with the statement 
that is relatively more opinionized/grandstanding or less factual/information-seeking.  
A statement is more opinionized or grandstanding if it denounces or praises an institution or a 
person, or expresses subjective views on a policy or a situation more explicitly and strongly.  
A statement is factual or information-seeking if it gives objective description of a situation or 
asking witnesses for information or their opinion. Which of the two statements below is 
more opinionized/grandstanding or less factual/information-seeking?  
Statement A: That is an extraordinarily important program that the committee strongly 
supports. I am very passionate about it, and could you talk to us about why you proposed 
cutting that program by nearly 40 percent? I hope that is not something that you intend to do. I 
would hope you will be as strong a supporter of that program as this committee is.  
Statement B: And, finally, what can we do to ensure the Military Health System has trained 
and ready providers to support the readiness of the force and provide a valued health benefit to 
our beneficiaries? 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of Grandstanding Score  
 
Note: The grandstanding scores for the statements in the entire dataset are rescaled to run from 0 to 100 and are reflected in the 
last two graphs. The scores are aggregated by each member in each Congress in the member-level data.  
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Sixth, through the repeated pairwise comparisons of paragraphs, the SentimentIt package 
provides “a grandstanding score” for each paragraph. It ranges from -2.4 to 2.6 with almost 
normal distribution. The first graph in Figure 1 presents its distribution for the 3000 sampled 
paragraphs.  
Next, I preprocess the entire corpus by tokenizing, stemming, lower-casing and removing 
punctuations and stop words and then construct three different document matrices: a doc2vec 
matrix and two document term matrices with either a plain bag of words approach or the term 
frequency-inverse document frequency application. Further details on the choice of key 
parameters used for each document matrix are discussed in the online appendix. 
For the purpose of cross validating the final model’s out-of-sample prediction 
performance, I randomly chose 300 paragraphs from the sample and set them aside. Using the 
values in each of the three document matrices for the remaining 2700 sample paragraphs as 
independent variables and their corresponding grandstanding scores as a dependent variable, I fit 
13 different learners: Random Forest, Lasso, Support Vector Machine, Gradient Boosting 
Machine, Discrete Bayesian Additive Regression Tree sampler, Bayesian Generalized Linear 
Model and Linear regression with varying parameters for the first four models, which results in 
39 model predictions for each paragraph in total. Then, I fit an Ensemble Bayesian Model 
Averaging model which assigned non-zero weights to 9 of the 39 models and combined them.16  
The use of the ensemble method in combination with three different document-level 
matrices significantly improved the out-of-sample prediction of the grandstanding score. By 
 
16 This ensemble method tends to better perform in predictions than any individual learning 
algorithm can do alone (Montgomery et al. 2012; Opitz and Maclin 1999, Rokach 2010). 
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predicting the 300 virgin paragraphs using the ensemble model, I measure the root-mean-
squared-error (RMSE), and it is 0.613. Compare it to the RMSE from the best single learning 
algorithm, Support Vector Machine of the Kernlab package using the doc2vec matrix, which is 
0.63 and to those from the other models ranging from 0.631 to 1.391. The Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient between the SentimentIt scores and the predicted scores of the ensemble model is 
0.703 while the same best performing single model produced the correlation of 0.673.17  
Finally, I rescale the grandstanding score to run from 0 to 100. Then, I aggregate the 
score by member and Congress, and the score runs between 17.65 and 85.78. The pooled 
member-level standard deviation across time is 4.34.18 The distributions of these rescaled 
measures are presented in the second and third graphs of Figure 1, respectively. 
In order to substantively validate the grandstanding score, I analyze the most frequent 
words of the statements in the bottom quartile and those in the top quartile. The full list of these 
words and detailed analysis are in the online appendix. The analysis suggests that the 
grandstanding statements in the top quartile are featured by making “point”(-s) on “problem”(-s) 
and “concern”(-s) on the most salient, divisive issues such as “secur”-(ity), “tax”, “health” “care” 
and “drug” frequently mentioning the “presid”(-ent), “administr”(-ation) and emphasizing 
 
17 In order to further validate the measurement statistically, I also tried the “Word score” model, 
which is widely used in the political science literature (Laver et al. 2003), and predicted the 
virgin paragraphs. However, its prediction is significantly worse than my model: The RMSE 
is .808 and the correlation is .597. These were computed using the plain document term matrix 
with 6000 words which is the size of the matrix at which the word score model performed best.      
18 The formula is provided in the online appendix along with descriptive statistics. 
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adjectives and adverbs. On the other hand, the non-grandstanding statements tend to refer to the 
words relevant to information-seeking: “inform”(-ation), “expla(i)n”(-ation), “report”(-s), 
“record”(-s), “research”, “data”, “studi”, “estim”(-ates), “assess”(-ment), “percent(-ages)” and 
“rate”(-s). 
Furthermore, I analyzed the top 30 and bottom 30 statements which I present in the 
online appendix. The most grandstanding statements tend to promote members’ opinions on 
policies, criticize a head person of an executive body or grill a witness while the least 
grandstanding statements tend to delve into details on a policy issue and ask of witnesses’ 
expectation on policy consequences, etc. These substantive analyses confirm that the 
grandstanding score successfully captures key characteristics of grandstanding statements and 
distinguishes them from those not. 




Figure 2 displays the changes in the grandstanding score over time. Each dot represents 
the average grandstanding score in each Congress with bars indicating 95% confidence intervals. 
It seems that legislators grandstand more over time, but the size of the increase is trivial.  
Figure 3. Partisan Difference in Grandstanding Scores Across Congresses 
 
Figure 3 on the mean difference between Democrats and Republicans across the ten 
Congresses with 95% confidence intervals shows a more informative, interesting pattern: In 
eight Congresses in which Democrats were the House minority they grandstanded more than 
Republicans on average whereas in two Congresses, 110th and 111th, where Republicans held the 
minority status Republicans grandstanded more. This result provides preliminary evidence in 
support of the first hypothesis on the minority members’ behavior. 
Figure 4 plots the distribution of the grandstanding score for the 114th Congress by the 
DW-Nominate score including the names of outliers. Those who made less than ten statements 
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are colored in grey to reflect the relative reliability of the scores. For example, Paul Ryan who 
served as the Speaker of the House made only one statement. Except those with too few 
statements, Walter Jones (R-NC), who served on the Armed Services Committee, has the highest 
grandstanding score among all House members. Charles Rangel (D-NY) who served on the 
Ways and Means Committee ranks the second. The third place goes to Adam Schiff (D-CA) who 
served as a minority member of the Select Committees on Intelligence and Benghazi Terrorist 
Attacks, which further validates the measure because both committees were notorious for 
members’ grandstanding and partisan fight in hearings during the 114th Congress. On the other 
hand, the least grandstanding representative is Alex Mooney (R-WV) who served on the Natural 
Resources Committee classified as a constituency-committee (Smith and Deering 1997).19  
In order to establish a better causal relationship proposed in the hypotheses, this study 
estimates the within-individual effect of the key explanatory variables. To test the first 
hypothesis on member’s minority status and its effect under unified government, I utilize the 
member-level data and binary indicators for the minority status and unified government. In the 
member-level regression model, I include fixed effects for member and Congress with clustered 
standard errors by member.20 Including the member-fixed effects leverages the panel structure of 
the data given members’ repeated observations over time, which allows estimation of within-
 
19 He also served at the Budget Committee, but there is no statement he made in this committee. 
20 Multilevel modeling literature argues that random effects for a level with too few groups may 
bias the group-level variance components as well as the group-level fixed effect estimates (Bryan 
& Jenkins 2016; Maas & Hox 2005). Thus, in all models, I choose to include Congress fixed 
effects, not random effects. 
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individual variations and facilitates making causal claims. The estimators indicate whether a 
change in a covariate makes the same member behave differently while controlling for any 
individual-specific unobservable, static confounders such as personality. In addition, Congress 
fixed effects account for any trends in grandstanding specific to each Congress.  
Figure 4. The Grandstanding Score by DW-Nominate Scores for the 114th Congress 
 
Despite the advantage of the member-level analysis in estimating within-individual 
estimators, the hypotheses on committee variations has to be tested using the statement-level data 
because some members sit on multiple committees so that using the member-level data it is 
impossible to tease out and compare members’ statements made in certain committees from 
those made in other committees. Thus, using the statement-level data, I conduct exact matching 
to compare grandstanding scores of the same member in the same Congress inside and outside of 
power committees, and I do the same for committees with jurisdiction over foreign affairs or 
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national security. The simple mean difference using a matched data set will provide a within-
individual effect of committees. Additionally, in order to test the effect of individual committees 
separately instead of collectively, I also present a regression model with committee fixed effects 
along with Congress fixed effects and random intercepts for members and hearings. However, 
note that the committee fixed effects will not serve as within-individual estimators. 
In the regression analysis, the following set of control variables are included to account 
for potential confounders. First, because those more loyal to the party may endeavor to send 
partisan messages during hearings more than those less so, I include an indicator for party 
leaders and the individual members’ party unity score which measures the frequency of voting 
with the party median on party unity votes. 
Second, electorally insecure members may benefit more by appealing to moderates while 
in contrast for secure members are less likely hurt but rather benefited by sending position-taking 
messages to their core supporters. Thus, I account for members’ electoral security by including 
the percentage of the votes that a member won in the previous election. Also, given the first-past-
the-post electoral system, the effect of members’ electoral security may not increase linearly with 
their messaging effort. Therefore, I also include the percentage of the vote squared. 
Third, because senior members enjoy more power and influence and are likely to have 
accumulated more expertise in their committee’s jurisdiction, they are in a good position to raise 
their voices and send partisan messages during hearings. However, as with electoral security, the 
effect of additional terms served may not have a linear effect on grandstanding. Therefore, I 
include the number of terms served by a member as well as its squared term. 
Fourth, given the previous finding that polarized policy preferences among committee 
members leads members to grandstand (Huitt 1954; Park 2017), in the statement-level analysis I 
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control for the level of polarization within each full committee measured by the distance between 
party means of the DW-NOMINATE scores following the practice in McCarty et al. (2006). I 
use the level of polarization for a full committee for subcommittees under it.  
Fifth, because members may have stronger motivation to grandstand on salient issues 
with broader audience, in the statement-level analysis I control for the number of members who 
spoke in each hearing as a proxy for the level of attention given to each hearing. Note that issue 
salience can also be measured by counting the number of times an issue is mentioned in news 
media, but this type of variable may suffer from endogeneity with the grandstanding score.  
In addition, I include the absolute value of the first dimension of each member’s DW-
NOMINATE score and indicators for partisan affiliation, female members and freshmen. In the 
member-level analysis I include indicators for chairs of committees or subcommittees, but in the 
statement-level analysis I include indicators for chair’s statements and ranking members’ 
statements, respectively. Also, I control for the frequency of statement of each member in each 
Congress in the member-level analysis but not in the statement-level analysis because it is 
unlikely to affect the intensity of grandstanding of each statement theoretically. I retrieved the 
party support scores from Voteview.com, but most of the individual-level variables are retrieved 
from the Legislative Effectiveness Score dataset constructed by Volden and Wiseman (2014).21 
 
21 I do not control for the legislative effectiveness score (LES) because members choose their 
strategy- either grandstanding or legislating- in a hearing based on institutional constraints, and 
thus controlling for the LES may introduce post-treatment bias. However, including it in the 
model does not change the results. Similar logic may apply to the party unity score as well, but 
including or excluding this variable in the model does not change the results, either.  
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In order to compare effect sizes across the covariates, I rescaled some variables to range 
from 0 to 1 if they do not. These variables include ideological intensity, legislative effectiveness 
score, vote percentages, and seniority. Descriptive statistics are in the online appendix.  
Also note that in the current article, I include select committees such as the Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence, the Select Committee on Benghazi and the Select Committee 
on Energy Independence and Global Warming because their hearings merit analysis. However, 
for fair comparison only among the standing committees, I additionally present the same set of 
analysis and its results excluding these select committees in the online appendix. The results 
barely change, and their substantive interpretations remain the same. 
 
Individual-level Analysis 
The first two models in Table 2 present results using member-level data with fixed effects for 
Congresses as well as members rendering the coefficients within-individual estimators. The 
dependent variable is the individual member’s grandstanding score in each Congress. Recall that 
the pooled member-level standard deviation across time is 4.34. The first model includes only 
the minimum number of control variables to show the reliability of the results presented in the 
second model which includes the full set of controls. In both models, minority status and its 
interaction with the unified government indicator are positive and statistically significant, which 
supports the first hypothesis. Specifically, based on the second model, under divided government 
a minority member is more likely to grandstand than he would as a majority member by .608 
point which constitutes about one seventh of the within-individual standard deviation of the 
grandstanding score. In addition, under unified government a minority member is more likely to 
grandstand by 1.286 points accounting for about one third of the within-individual standard 
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deviation than he would as a majority member. Therefore, under both government types the same 
member is more likely to grandstand when he is of the minority party, but the gap is greater 
under unified government as expected. Furthermore, a majority member is more likely to 
grandstand under divided government by 1.35 points than under unified government. Thus, both 
majority and minority members tend to grandstand more under divided government. 
Table 2. Regression Results 
 Member-level Statement-level 
Model description Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Minority .527** .608** .949*** .964*** 
 (.254) (.263) (.059) (.065) 
Unified -.101 -1.350 .357 -.381 
 (.510) (.922) (.263) (.291) 
Minority*Unified .636** .678** .138* .125 
 (.305) (.338) (.081) (.090) 
Party support  .516  -.567 
  (2.765)  (.595) 
Vote share (%)  6.569  7.023*** 
  (7.285)  (1.849) 
Vote share squared   -.048  -.045*** 
  (.047)  (.012) 
Seniority  .685  1.517* 
  (4.146)  (.815) 
Seniority squared  .082*  -.047*** 
  (.044)  (.011) 
Ideological   -3.213*  -.849* 
intensity  (1.690)  (.448) 
Democrat  -6.449  .248 
  (6.562)  (.253) 
Freshman  -.900***  -.428*** 
  (.248)  (.080) 
Female  -  -.425 
    (.326) 
Chair -1.212** -1.141**   
 (.481) (.483)   
Subcommittee -1.487*** -1.510***   
chair (.240) (.239)   
Chair’s   -4.334*** -4.363*** 
statements   (.048) (.049) 
Ranking member’s   -.879*** -.942*** 
statement   (.074) (.075) 
Party leader 1.109* 1.226** .172 .083 
 (.567) (.552) (.145) (.146) 
Statement  -14.899*** -14.610***   
frequency (1.212) (1.220)   
Number of   4.203*** 4.161*** 
speakers   (.308) (.309) 
Polarization within   -.924** -.946** 
committee   (.457) (.458) 
Constant 40.918*** 38.970*** 43.507*** 41.885*** 
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 (.236) (3.471) (.357) (.889) 
Member effect Fixed Fixed Random Random 
Hearing effect - - Random Random 
Committee effect - - Fixed Fixed 
Congress effect Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed 
Observations 3,708 3,637 999,666 987,808 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
The dependent variable is grandstanding score. 
Note: The coefficient for the female variable in Model 2 was not estimated due to collinearity. 
 
 
Here, it is interesting but also counterintuitive to note that when a member becomes a 
minority member he grandstands more when his party controls the White House than he would 
when his party does not control neither the White House nor the House of the Congress. This is 
probably because under unified government the majority has less motivation to send critical 
messages against the administration so that committee chairs are less likely to hold hearings 
which may potentially provide minority members with opportunities to grandstand; however, 
under divided government chairs may more actively hold hearings on partisan issues in which 
majority members can send partisan messages, and as a result minority members end up 
grandstanding more to counteract majority members’ messaging effort.  
 
Statement-level Analysis 
In order to test the hypotheses on committee effects, I utilize statement-level data and exact 
matching on members in a given Congress. Grandstanding behavior measured at the statement-
level is more appropriate to test the committee effects, given that each statement can be nested 
within its specific committee of origin, but the statement-level regression models do not facilitate 
within-individual estimators. As an alternative solution, I isolate members of Congress who 
served on both a powerful committee or a committee with jurisdiction over foreign affairs or 
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national security policy as well as at least one additional committee in the same Congress and 
then aggregate these members’ statement-level data by member, Congress and whether a 
statement was made in one of the committees of interest or not in order to exact-match the 
aggregated data based on this information. The procedure is as follows.  
First, I measure the average grandstanding score for each member inside and outside of 
the four powerful committees in each Congress and do the same with regards to the four 
committees with jurisdiction over foreign affairs or national security policy. There are 564 non-
chair members who have served in at least one powerful committee and at least one non-power 
committee in the same Congress, and 758 members who have served on at least one committee 
with jurisdiction over foreign affairs or national security policy and at least one other committee 
without jurisdiction over those types of policies. I treat these two samples of members as 
separate samples in the remainder of the analysis using matching. 
Second, using only the data on these samples of members of Congress, which constitutes 
my matched data sets, I compare the average grandstanding scores of their statements made 
during hearings held by the committees of interest to those made during hearings held by other 
committees. In the first sample of 564 members who served on at least one powerful committee 
and other committee in the same Congress, the average grandstanding scores for their statements 
made during hearings held by those committees are 47.913 and 45.428, respectively. The size   
of the gap is a little more than a half of the pooled within-individual standard deviation of the 
grandstanding score. In the second sample of 758 members who served on at least one committee 
with jurisdiction over foreign affairs or national security policy and one other committee in the 
same Congress, the average grandstanding scores for their statements made during hearings held 
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by those committees are 46.606 and 44.556, respectively. The difference accounts for .472 times 
the pooled within-individual standard deviation. 
Table 3. Difference in Means Using the Matched Dataset to Test Committee Effects 
Treatment Committees Powerful Foreign & Security 
In these committees 47.913 46.606 
In other committees 45.428 44.556 
Difference (in times of s.d.) 2.485 (.573) 2.050 (.472) 
P-value from a t-test .000 .000 
Number of members 564 758 
Note: To test the effect of powerful committees, all chairs’ statements were excluded from the analysis. 
 Third, using t-tests, I find that members grandstand more in hearings held before 
powerful committees and committees with jurisdiction over foreign affairs or national security 
policy than they do in hearings held by other committees (p-value < .001 in both tests). The 
results are summarized in Table 3. These results using matching provide within-individual 
effects of committees and empirical support for the second and third hypotheses. For the purpose 
of robustness checks, I further conducted regression analysis using the matched datasets with the 
treatment variable and the same set of controls included in Model 2 in Table 2. The coefficients 
on the treatment variable barely change from the size of differences between the treated and 
controlled groups presented in Table 3. The full regression results are in the online appendix. 
While the results using matching showed the collective effects of certain types of 
committees, it is worth measuring the effects of individual committees and check if there is any 
variation among powerful committees and among the committees with jurisdiction over foreign 
affairs or national security policy. To this end, Models 3 and 4 in Table 2 present regression 
models using the statement-level data with committee fixed effects along with fixed effects for 
Congresses and random effects for members and hearings to account for group-level variance. 
The dependent variable is the grandstanding score of each statement. Model 3 includes only the 
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minimum set of controls, and Model 4 presents the full set of control variables. However, note 
that the effects estimated in these models are not within-individual estimators. 
The key finding of this statement-level regression analysis is the coefficients on the fixed 
effects for individual committees which facilitate comparison of the relative levels of 
grandstanding across committees. These coefficients in Model 4 are presented in Figure 5 with 
95% confidence interval.22 The names of powerful committees are in orange, and the names of 
committees with jurisdiction on foreign affairs or national security are in purple. The Committee 
on Oversight and Government Reform is set as the baseline category in the model because its 
average grandstanding score is close to the mean grandstanding score of all statements in the 
data. Note that there are 22 unique committees, and the coefficient of the baseline group is not 
measured.  
It is interesting that there are some variations within each set of committees of interest. 
However, all powerful committees except the Appropriations committee have positive and 
statistically significant coefficients corroborating the results in support of the second hypothesis. 
Two of the committees with jurisdiction on foreign affairs or national security policy ranks the 
top two committees mainly contributing for the empirical support of the third hypothesis. 
However, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence scores low with statistically 
insignificant coefficient, which may be because it holds most of the major hearings in closed-
door sessions so that it is hard to capture the true characteristics of their hearings. The 
Committee on Armed Services ranks low as well, which is probably because although it deals 
 
22 Table A5 in the online appendix presents the coefficients on committee fixed effects as well as 
the average grandstanding score of statements made in hearings before each committee. 
31 
 
with security issues that the President dominates it has to debate and consider the defense 
authorization bill annually which keeps the committee busy with legislative activities in the early 
months of a year.  
 
 
Figure 5. Coefficients on Individual Committees in Model 4 with 95% CI 
 
The names of the powerful committee are in orange, and those of the foreign or national security committees in purple. 
The baseline committee is the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. Therefore, no coefficient is estimated 
for this committee. 
In summary, my results demonstrate within-individual effects supportive of all the 
hypotheses presented in this article through panel data analysis and exact matching. First, 
minority members are more likely to engage in grandstanding behavior in general than they do 
when they were majority members, and this is particularly more so during periods of unified 
32 
 
government. Additionally, the finding that both majority and minority members tend to 
grandstand more under divided government suggests that oversight is one of the major sources of 
grandstanding and emphasizes committee chairs’ power to gatekeep issues to be considered in 
hearings in a way to facilitate majority members’ grandstanding while blocking that of minority 
members. It further implies that net grandstanding activities is likely be larger under divided 
government than under unified government. 
Second, the same member tends to engage in more grandstanding behavior in hearings 
held by powerful committees than he does in hearings held by other committees. This suggests 
that characteristics of powerful committees such as leadership-centered legislative procedures 
may incentivize ordinary members to focus on position-taking during public hearings. 
Third, members of Congress are more likely to grandstand during hearings held by 
committees with jurisdiction over foreign affairs or national security policy. The President has 
more power and responsibility over these policy areas so that members of Congress are relatively 
more interested in sending political messages during hearings held by these committees as 
compared to hearings held in other venues.  
However, these findings should be interpreted as providing descriptive evidence in favor 
of the hypotheses rather than definitive evidence due to the observational nature of the data. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has demonstrated that congressional committee members tend to grandstand in 
committee hearings when they have limited legislative opportunities to pursue their own policy 
agenda using original data and a new measurement, the grandstanding score. This finding further 
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implies that members resort to making statements favorable to themselves or their party in order 
to appeal to voters if they cannot effectively appeal by making policies representing their target 
audience. Therefore, members’ grandstanding behavior in committee hearings may be a part of 
their electoral campaign strategy deliberately chosen rather than spontaneous reaction to the 
discourse occurring in hearings. Especially given the previous findings that public hearings 
affect the president’s approval rating and solicit campaign contributions (DeGregorio 1992; 
Esterling 2007; Kriner and Schikler 2014), this electoral explanation of members’ grandstanding 
behavior in hearings gains power. Further, this explanation illuminates the role of committee 
hearings as a communication channel between members of Congress and the public which has 
been discussed in classic literature on congressional committees (Fenno 1973; Huitt 1954) but 
received less attention in recent studies. Therefore, this article contributes to the study of 
congressional committees. More broadly, it also makes a novel empirical contribution to the 
literature on message politics by finding that messaging activities manifest even in committee 
hearings.  
Given that committee hearings continue in Congress at an unabated rate despite the 
waning influence of committees in the legislative process under the strong party government 
(Aldrich and Rohde 2009, Rohde 1991), it is important and timely to study committee members’ 
political motivation to hold and participate in hearings other than conducting committee 
business. This article addressed one mechanism: to send political messages to the public. 
Although this analysis did not find much variation across time in committee members’ 
messaging efforts in hearings because it only looked at the period in which the transition from 
committee government to party government was already settled, future research utilizing hearing 
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data extended to earlier Congresses to test whether this messaging trend increased over time as 
the legislative role of congressional committees diminished will be productive. 
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